


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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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USSR-Cyprus: Moscow has made its strongest public statement thus far in support of Makarios, but there is no evidence that it has made any specific commitments.

The Soviet Government statement on 15 August promising to "help" Cyprus in case of invasion avoided committing Soviet military forces in case of Turkish intervention. The statement appears intended to bring increased pressure on Turkey and will enable Moscow to claim credit if a Turkish invasion fails to materialize.

Thus far, there has been no evidence of Soviet alert measures or movements in areas bordering Turkey.

Moscow will continue to be subjected to Greek Cypriot pressure for tangible support. However, Moscow has no direct interests in the Cyprus situation and probably calculates that it has more to gain by exploiting the disruption of the southern end of NATO than by risking direct involvement.

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South Vietnam: The broad governmental reorganization proclaimed yesterday is designed to tighten government political authority and to purge the leadership of disruptive elements.

The new government charter, unanimously adopted by a special meeting of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC), provides for a strong presidential system.

[The MRC elected General Khanh, who remains MRC chairman, president by a vote of 50 to 8. Despite Khanh's broad powers, ultimate authority apparently rests with the MRC: The MRC is responsible for appointing a majority of the projected 140-man Legislative Council, and has indirect influence in the supervision of the judiciary.]

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The reorganization apparently reflects the views of Defense Minister General Khiem, whose followers dominate the executive committee of the MRC and who is expected to be named vice president. Khiem may increasingly become the real power in the government, but all indications presently suggest that he and Khanh are fully cooperating.

[There have been reports that some opposition to the changes exists in the MRC, and that its leaders are uneasy over the reaction of General Minh, who has been deposed as chief of state and who boycotted the meetings. Khanh has been reluctant to provide details of pending cabinet changes, which are expected to remove some civilian politicians and possibly some military officers.]

[Unspecified security measures were reportedly put into effect on 15 August to avoid any trouble as a result of the government changes.]

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India - Southeast Asia: New Delhi is contemplating a major shift in policy toward Southeast Asia.

Proposals are before Prime Minister Shastri to take the conflicts in Laos and Vietnam to the Security Council, and to take action under UN aegis to supplant the framework established under the 1954 Geneva Accords.

This action would include disestablishment of the International Control Commission--which the Indians chair--and the assignment of UN peace-keeping forces, including Indian troops, along the 17th parallel and in the Plaine des Jarres. The Indians would not intend that these forces would impair the role of the US in the area.

According to Indian officials, India's main object in advancing such proposals, which would mark a radical departure from Nehru's policies, would be to exert more active anti - Chinese Communist influence in the area.


Indian officials believe Shastri will give the go-ahead for consultations on these proposals in Moscow and Washington, and believe that Moscow can be persuaded to go along. They believe that UN involvement would put an end to consideration of a new 14-nation conference.

It is doubtful, however, that the USSR would favor the Indian proposals in their present form. Although the Soviet Union has made it clear that it intends to dissociate itself from the Geneva co-chairmanship as much as possible, Moscow would nevertheless probably be reluctant to sanction UN intervention, which both Hanoi and Peiping have explicitly rejected.

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DAILY BRIEF





Laos: Tripartite talks in Paris between Laotian factions now appear certain.

On 15 August Pathet Lao chief Souphannouvong agreed to Premier Souvanna's suggestion of 24 August as the date for beginning talks preparatory to a re-convened Geneva conference on Laos. \*Souvanna, in a conversation with the US Ambassador on 16 August, was pessimistic concerning the results of the meeting.

[In Laos, the military situation has been quiet following the government's successful offensive in the Phou Koun - Muong Kassy areas. Government forces are now engaged in a clearing operation against Communist troops southwest of Muong Kassy who were dislodged from their positions along route 13 during the offensive.]

[The Pathet Lao are maintaining heavy antiaircraft fire against the continuing T-28 air strikes by the government against their positions. On 13 August a T-28 aircraft, flown by a Thai pilot, was shot down over Phou Kout hill. An air search has located the plane, which was completely demolished. This is the third shoot-down suffered recently by the small Laotian T-28 striking force.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Indonesia: Further anti-US demonstrations will probably occur this week following the 14 August take-over of the USIS library at Jogjakarta by the local government. The government acted after a mob of several thousand had surrounded the library and refused to disperse. New demonstrations are likely to grow out of the nationwide celebrations of Indonesian independence, which officially falls on 17 August.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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